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Abstract
This paper aims to study whether government type in a PR electoral system (i.e.,
coalition, minority, or majority) has an e↵ect on corruption. Using data of Spanish lo-
cal governments for the 1999-2007 period (two consecutive terms-of-o ce), we compare
nearly identical municipalities regarding their political characteristics, with the only
di↵erence that one is a coalition and the other a majority government. Our findings
reveal that the e↵ect of coalition (and neither minority) governments on corruption is
not di↵erent than in majority ones.
Keywords: corruption, coalitions, government
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1 Introduction
Corruption has devastating economic and political e↵ects. It is negatively correlated
with the most important welfare indicators. For example, there is evidence that corruption
reduces growth (Mauro, 1995), increases inflation (Al-Marhubi, 2000) and within country
inequality (Gupta et al., 2002), and undermines trust in government and the legitimacy of
democracy (Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas, 2014).
How can citizens be protected of such an evil? We know that corruption tends to decrease
with democracy: competitive elections, the presence of a free press and an independent ju-
diciary do seem to mitigate corruption (Lenderman et al, 2005, Boix and Adsera, 2003).
There are also some predictions regarding the e↵ects of electoral systems on corruption, al-
though the empirical evidence is not conclusive (Golden and Mahdavi, 2015). Majoritarian
systems are associated with lower perceived corruption. They are said to promote biparti-
sanship so increasing alternation in government and thus, political competition1. Regarding
parliamentary systems, closed-list proportional representation is said to generate greater
perceived corruption than PR systems with open lists (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Kunicova´
and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). District magnitude might also play an important role within
proportional systems: countries with small electoral districts tend to have more corruption
in closed-list systems (Persson et al, 2003) while political corruption gets more severe as
district magnitude increases under open-list2.
In this paper we focus on an institutional di↵erence that has been largely overlooked by
the literature. Proportional systems generate fragmented legislatures and as a result also
very di↵erent government typologies: majorities, minorities and coalitions. Which of these
government types are more prone to corruption? There is evidence that coalitions behave
di↵erently than majority governments in a variety of settings. For example, coalitions present
larger budgetary deficits (Volkerink et al, 2001; Edin and Ohlsson, 1991) than majorities,
1Other important studies analysing how political systems a↵ect corruption show an important role of
federalism. It would lower corruption exposing politicians to more direct accountability (theoretically
Arikan, 2004, empirically Fisman and Gatti, 2000) but this e↵ect disappears if federalism presents a revenue-
expenditure mismatch. This would reduce the link between politicians performance and e↵ort and it could
create fiscal illusion Fisman and Gatti, 2002 .
2Larger districts with more candidates increase competitiveness and candidates concern about personal
reputation and political di↵erentiation (Chang and Golden, 2006).
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and there is also some evidence suggesting that fiscal policy is also di↵erent in minority
governments (Falco´ -Gimeno, 2011). Coalitions are also punished at elections for inflation or
unemployment than majorities (Anderson, 2000). Also, coalitions are said to be vulnerable
to legislative gridlock and so to have problems in reaching agreements regarding complex
policies (Smart et al., 2011).
However, there are virtually no papers studying the link between government type and
corruption. On the theory side, there is the paper by Kiss (2000), who shows that coalitions
can be equally accountable to citizens than majorities in some situations. On the empirical
side, Tavits (2007), using plain OLS on a cross section of countries, finds that majorities
are less corrupt than coalitions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study providing
causal evidence on the e↵ect of coalition governments on corruption. The reason might be
that most countries with PR systems (and so with coalitions governments) are advanced
democracies with low levels of corruption (e.g. the Nordic countries), and thus, they do not
provide the setting needed to identify the e↵ect of coalitions on corruption. Our country
of study, Spain, presents a good setting to analyze the relationship between coalitions and
corruption at the local government level. On the one hand, with a PR system, it has a high
level of political fragmentation and a large number of coalition governments. On the other
hand, during the past housing boom, there have been a large number of corruption scandals
related to land use regulation, in Spain a responsibility of local governments. Moreover,
there has been recent debate on the need to reform the local electoral law. In August 2014,
the central government presented a proposal to reform the local electoral system. They
proposed that the most voted party should be able to govern without the need of forming a
coalition. The main argument used to defend this proposal was that coalition governments
tend to be more corrupt than majorities. However, the case- based evidence is inconclusive
regarding this statement, since it is quite easy to find both coalitions and majorities among
the most prominent corruption scandals3.
In our study, we use data of Spanish local governments for the 1999-2007 period (two
consecutive terms-of-o ce). We restrict our analysis to close elections, therefore comparing
coalitions where the most voted party got one seat less than the number needed to control
3?Data contradict the arguments used by the PP to defend the local electoral reform?, (El Pa´ıs 30/8/2014)
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the council against majority governments where the most voted party got one seat in excess
of that number. Thus there is just one seat of di↵erence between governments in our treated
(coalitions) and control group (majorities), suggesting that di↵erences between these two
groups in variables that might be drivers of corruption should be low. To further ensure
that these two groups are fully comparable, we restrict the control group to municipalities
that are identical on a set of relevant political characteristics (i.e., number of seats in the
council, party of the mayor, main opposition party, number of parties in the council) to our
coalition governments. Another important element of our analysis is that we are also able
to study whether minority governments behave di↵erently than coalitions. Our results are
clear: we do not find that coalition (and neither minority) governments are more corrupt
than the majority ones.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the arguments that
justify why coalition governments could be more corrupt (or not) than the majority ones.
Section 3 explains the Spanish setting; its political system and the origin and magnitude
of political corruption. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology. The results are
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a summary and the main findings.
2 Are coalitions more corrupt than majorities?
This section compiles the main arguments that can explain why coalition governments
could behave di↵erently that the majority ones regarding corruption. There are arguments
on both directions. Thus, coalition governments could be more or less corrupt than majority
ones. In the last subsection these arguments are used to justify whether we should expect a
di↵erent behavior from minority governments.
2.1 YES, coalitions are more corrupt
Clarity of responsibility
Citizens ability to assign responsibility to the government depends on the extent to which
those who are responsible can be identified (Powell, 2000). In a coalition government, it is
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more di cult for the voter to determine exactly who is responsible for government outputs.
Using country data and a cross section analysis, Tavits, 2007 finds a negative correlation
between majority government and corruption.
Corruption as part of the deal
A proportional system facilitates the presence of a larger number of parties than a pres-
idential one. At the local level, it can mean the creation, and entry in the government, of
many parties with di↵erent interests. In Spain, a large number of new parties have been
created whose main aim is to try to avoid new developments. When any party obtains a
majority, to form a coalition government there is a negotiation among parties. These ne-
gotiations can be based on programmatic points of their political agenda. Alternatively,
coalitions can be formed on the base of political exchanges, such as pork barrel spending,
cabinet positions or allowance of corruption. An example of this type of political exchange is
the case of Telde after the 2003 local elections. PP4 was able to form a coalition government
with CIUCA5 assigning the land use responsibility to a CIUCA representative.
Low incentives to denounce
The incentives to denounce a corruption scandal are lower in coalition governments than
in majority ones. This e↵ect can be generated, on the one hand, by variable coalitions, that
is those that can be formed with alternative parties. If a party has expectations of forming
a coalition with one of the parties implied in a corruption scandal, he would have lower
incentives to denounce it. On the other hand, once a party is a member of a coalition, it is
politically costly to break it ( Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman, 2005).
4Partido Popular, main right wing party in Spain.
5Ciudadanos para el Cambio, Telde0s local party.
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2.2 NO, coalitions are not more corrupt
More people present
In a coalition government there are more (and diverse) eyes watching the decisions of
the government than in a majority one. Information has to be shared among the parties
that form the coalition. This is not the case in majority governments, where the mayor has
an important autonomy and only important decisions have to be voted at the city council.
Moreover, coalitions are in principle formed between parties that trust on each other. Inap-
propriate political decisions could imply the dissolution of a coalition. For example, in Lugo,
a Spanish municipality, the BNG abandoned the coalition in 2012 because the mayor, from
the PSdeG, was accused in a corruption ion scandal.
Veto players
Bargaining costs are higher in coalition governments than in majority ones. In an ex-
treme, coalitions can generate government inaction (Ashworth et al., 2005) if it is really
di cult or impossible to reach an agreement between the members of the coalition. For
example, under a coalition it could be very di cult to pass a new development plan if not all
the members of the coalition agree on its characteristics. This is not the case in a majority
government, where the development plan can be implemented even if they do not have the
support of any additional party. Moreover, if corruption is implemented through bribes to
politicians, its costs are also higher under a coalition government. In this case, the developer
quite likely would have to bribe and convince politicians from di↵erent parties. This makes
corruption more di cult to arise.
Lost of power
Corruption scandals could imply an electoral punishment. There is evidence for Spain
that, on average, mayors involved on corruption scandals reduce their vote share in 4% in
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the next elections (Anduiza et al. 2013, Costas-Pe´rez et al 2012). In the case of majority
governments that does not necessarily translate into a loss of o ce. It could imply a reduction
in their electoral margin or the need to form a coalition. However, in the case of coalitions,
a reduction in the vote share obtained can imply a loss of o ce. This argument reduces the
incentives of coalition governments to be corrupt, especially when they have a small electoral
margin.
2.3 Coalitions versus minorities
These previous arguments, settled when comparing coalition governments versus major-
ity ones, can be used to identify the potential di↵erences between coalition and minority
governments.
Clarity of responsibility, corruption as a part of the deal and more people present are
arguments that imply di↵erent conclusions for the case of minority governments. With only
one party in the government, it is very clear who is responsible if there is a corruption
scandal and there is no need to negotiate with other parties to form the government. These
two arguments would suggest that minorities are not more corrupt than majorities, contrary
to the coalition0s comparison. In minority governments, as in majorities, there is only one
party that has all the information about the decisions taken by the government. Thus, this
argument is not valid in the case minorities to justify that they should be less corrupt.
Similar to coalitions, minorities have less incentive to be corrupt due to the fact that the
electoral punish can easily imply a loss of o ce. Veto players can also, in some circumstances,
make minorities less corrupt. This is the case when the political decision has to be voted
at the city council. Minorities, like coalitions, would have low incentive to denounce only if
they consider that it is quite likely that they could form a coalition in the future with the
political party involved in a corruption scandal.
Thus, as in the case of coalition governments, there are arguments than justify that a
minority government should be more and less corrupt than a majority one.
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3 The Spanish case
Spain presents the appropriate setting to study the incidence of government typologies
(e.g., majority vs. coalition) on corruption. We justify the focus on Spain by describing the
institutional framework and its consequences on political corruption.
3.1 Institutional framework
Spain is organized in three tiers of government: central government, seventeen au-
tonomous communities and over eight thousand municipalities (most of them are quite small).
Municipalities have competences on traditional responsibilities assigned to the local public
sector such as environmental services, urban planning, public transport, welfare, etc. with
the exception of education. This expenditure is approximately financed 2/3 with own rev-
enues and 1/3 by upper-levels transfers. these revenues are not substantial enough to cover
local spending demands. Financially constrained municipalities have turned towards less
orthodox means of financing, including various types of construction-related taxes, develop-
ment fees, and sales of public land.
As a result of the proportional electoral system used to elect municipal representatives
there is a substantial degree of fragmentation in the city council, which includes a large
number of parties with varying interests (e.g., pro or anti development, see Sole´ -Olle´ and
Viladecans, 2013). The consequence of this is a non-deniable proportion of coalition and
minority governments. The number of seats to be elected in each municipality grows with
population size6 They are distributed among the parties getting more than 5% of the popular
vote using the d’Hondt rule: total votes cast for each party are divided by 1, then by 2, then
3, right up to the total number of seats to be allocated creating a series of ’comparison
numbers’. These numbers are then ranked and the total number of seats are allocated
following this ranking.
The term last four years. All representatives can be candidates for mayor. The represen-
6Up to 100 habitants 3 seats, form 101 to 250: 5; 251 to 1,000: 7; 1,001 to 2.000: 9; 2,001 to 5,000: 11;
5,001 to 10,000: 13; 10,001 to 20,000: 17; 20,001 to 50,000: 21; 50,001 to 100,000: 25 and over 100,001 a
Councillor more per 100,000 residents or fraction, adding one more when the result is an even number.
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tative receiving the majority of votes in the council is elected mayor. If this majority is not
obtained the representative occupying the first place on the winning party’s list (in terms
of popular vote) is named mayor. Elections are held every four years simultaneously in all
municipalities and they cannot be hold at half term. But, there may be a government change
if an alternative majority present a vote of no confidence. This procedure leads to di↵erent
government possibilities; majorities, minorities and coalitions with the winning party (in
terms of popular vote) participating in the government or not.
3.2 Political corruption in Spain
Most corruption cases occurring in Spain in the last two decades refer to political cor-
ruption (Villoria and Jimenez, 2012). This type of corruption implies bribes received by
representatives in exchange for urban-related favors. An special characteristic of this type
of corruption is that citizens do not notice it unless there is a scandal.
The vast majority of corruption cases are related to land use regulation. Between 1997
and 2007 Spain experimented a housing boom of an unseen magnitude. Housing prices almost
doubled during this period and housing construction grew at rates of 5 per cent yearly leading
to an excess of stock at the end of the period. The main instrument of land use regulation,
town planning is in the hands of municipalities. The stringency of these regulations, coupled
with the huge shift in housing demand, generated enormous rents, providing incentives for
corrupt deals between developers and local politicians(Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Sole´-Olle´
and Viladecans-Marsal, 2012). Larger numbers of corruption scandals in Spain are related
with local politicians or public workers changing land uses i.e allowing building in previously
forbidden areas, increasing construction densities or designing new areas to be developed
(Fundacio´n Alternativas, 2007). Those related to questionable contracts between developers
and local authorities (Transparency International, 2007).
This analysis uses an extensive database that reports published political corruption scan-
dals related to municipalities for the period 1995-2011. This database uses information of
corruption scandals compiled by the Fundacio´n Alternativas (2007), a Spanish think tank.
This organization has close link with the main left-wing party PSOE. In order to avoid
possible bias, its reliability was verified. The dataset was compared with another one com-
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piled by the right-wing newspaper ”El Mundo”. The comparison showed that the dataset
was not biased in its coverage of the scandals involving di↵erent parties. The dataset was
completed with internet-guided searches in Factiva, a paid digital information management
service covering all national and many of the regional newspapers.
Table 1: Corruption scandals for eectoral period
Term
1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 Total
Cases published same period 11 201 296 8 516
Cases published after the period 24 49 56 71 200
Total cases 35 250 352 79 716
Table 1 shows the number of corruption scandals in every electoral term. The table
present those cases published during the same term and those published after the period.
Most of the corruption scandals are published in the term in which it took place. As we can
see, the larger number of corruption cases corresponds to the period 1999-2007 coinciding
with the housing boom in Spain. This fact would empirically support the link explained
before between political corruption and housing bubble. This dataset has information for
716 corruption cases with more than 600 corresponding to the period 1999-2007.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
We use data of two consecutive terms of o ce, 1999-2003 and 2003-2007. This period of
time coincides with the housing boom and covers the majority of the corruption scandals.
The data used in the study can be divided in three types: corruption scandals (described in
the previous section), information referring local electoral outcomes and a group of control
variables regarding demographic, economic and budget indicators for Spanish municipalities..




Information on vote share, seats and party of the mayor for the 1999 and 2003 local
elections. With this information we can determine the typology of government ruling in
each municipality; majority, minority or coalition.
We identify them in the following way: Those municipalities where the winning party
obtained at least the half plus one seats will be, without any doubt, absolute majorities. In
all the other cases it can be either coalition or a minority government. In close elections
-defined as those municipalities whose winning party (in term of votes) obtained the half
of the seats plus or minus one- we have used the following rule to define coalitions and
minorities: Those municipalities where the winning party (in terms of votes) sustains the
power will be minorities. Those where the winning party (in term of votes) is not sustaining
the power will be defined as coalition. In this last situation an alternative majority to the
winning party (in term of votes) is ruling the city council: a coalition.
The principal caveat to this procedure is that considers some minority governments that
indeed were coalitions. The justification is the following: If a considered minority were a
coalition, it would mean that the ideological distribution of seats within the city council
avoids the construction of an alternative coalition. That is, there is at least another party
belonging to the mayor0 ideological block (left or right wing).Therefore, an alternative ma-
jority cannot be formed. Thus, we consider that even if this government was a coalition, it
was not a necessary one. The winning party could rule in minority without the fear of al-
ternative majorities. Table 4a in section 4.4 present some examples of identified governments.
Demographic, economic and budget control variables
We use demographic, economic and budget control variables that could be related with
the possibility of corruption. These variables will be used to check if compared munici-
palities present the same characteristics. For demography we account for the population,
population growth, education level, share of population over the 65 and under the 16 years.
Economic variables control for income per capita, the share of secondary residences, vehicle
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pc., property tax rate and property tax base pc. Finally budget indicators refer to current
expenditure pc., total expenditure pc., current revenues pc. and debt burden. For example,
population growth leads to more construction increasing incentives to corruption. Debt bur-
den causes the need to increase revenues and hence, more incentives to construct in order to
collect more taxes.
These control variables comes basically from four sources: Local census and The census
of population and houses by the National Institute of Statistics (www.ine.es), the Span-
ish Economic Yearbook 1999 by ”La Caixa” and municipalities budget information by the
Spanish Ministry of Treasury.
Table 1A presents a summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis reporting
also a short explanation and source. First, the political variables used to perform the match
8explained in next section: identification strategy). Followed by the set of control variables
grouped by its nature; demographic, economic and budget characteristics. These variables
will be used to check the balance after the match. If treated and control groups present
statistically significant di↵erences.
4.2 Identification Strategy
This study focuses on the period 1999-2007 considering those municipalities with more
than two thousand habitants. In order to answer properly the question whether coalition
governments are really bad news for corruption we must compare a set of coalition govern-
ments with a comparable set of majority ones. We cannot directly compare them in the full
sample.
A raw comparison would not give an appropriate explanation to our question. For ex-
ample, we would be comparing large majorities with extremely politically fragmented mu-
nicipalities. Compared municipalities would present di↵erent characteristics on political,
demographic, economic and budget variables. Moreover, the share of majorities with respect
to minorities and coalitions is di↵erent. Among 4,627 observations (being those municipali-
ties over two thousand habitants for the two terms 1999-2003 and 2003-2007) there are 2,892
majorities representing the 62,50% of the total. Therefore, minorities and coalition together
represents only the 37,50% of cases.
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The e↵ect of government type on corruption will be computed using the following regres-
sion:
Corruptionit = ↵ +   ⇤ Treatedit + uit
Being Corruptionit =1 if there was at least one corruption scandal in a municipality i dur-
ing the term of o ce t, =0 otherwise and Treated referring to minorities, coalition or both
together depending on the regression.
The problem when applying this regression is that the error term will be correlated with
the independent variable. Table 3 shows how control and treated group present di↵erences
in most of the characteristics. Those characteristics can determine corruption possibilities
and government type. The possibilities of corruption can promote the entrance of new
parties increasing political fragmentation. Hence, the formation of coalitions. Moreover,
we would be comparing important urbanized touristic places with interior areas presenting
lower economic activity. To solve this correlation we could control in the regression for all
this characteristics but we would still have unbalances groups and this practice may obtain
biased results (Keel et al., 2015).
In order to obtain those comparable sets we use the following strategy: A regression
discontinuity approach on close elections - those municipalities where the winning party ob-
tained half of the seats plus/minus determining if it could rule as majority or not - and
posteriorly a match based on political characteristics. This procedure will allow us to obtain
balanced samples. The comparison allows the study of the govern type e↵ect on corruption.
This combination of a regression discontinuity design with a match has been used in previous
studies such as Keele et al., 2015.
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Table 2: Political characteristics: Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Full Sample Close elections Close elections
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest] [ttest]
Total number of seats 14.498 13.204 1.294 13.288 12.789 0.499 13.234 13.235 -0.001
[9.71]*** [3.07]*** [-0.01]
Mayor ideology 0.341 0.500 -0.159 0.338 0.477 -0.139 0.321 0.321 0.000
[-9.83]*** [-6.26]*** [0.00]
Opposition ideology 0.423 0.686 -0.263 0.434 0.563 -0.129 0,564 0.564 0.000
[15.91]*** [5.64]*** [0.00]
N. parties opposition 2.154 1.519 0.632 1.892 1.582 0.310 1.746 1.746 0.000
[22.86]*** [9.08]*** [0.00]
N. Observations 1,735 2,892 4,627 962 1,319 2,281 625 867 1,492
Notes: (1) [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) Mayor and opposition ideology gives value 0=left and 1=right
Table 3: Control characteristics: Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Full Sample Close elections Close elections
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 15.940 12.233 3.707 10.931 10.819 0.112 10.849 10.812 0.037
[3.85]*** [0.10] [0.03]
Population growth 2.125 0.984 1.1141 1.907 1.017 0.890 1.607 1.149 0.458
[3.65]*** [2.23]** [0.98]
Education level 36.221 34.365 1.856 35.377 34.225 1.152 35.353 34.693 0.660
[7.01]*** [3.18]*** [1.48]
Population under 16years 16.711 16.572 0.139 16.648 16.728 -0.080 16.796 16.915 -0.119
[1.45] [-0.63] [-0.74]
Population over 65years 16.910 18.501 -1.591 17.666 18.393 -0.727 17.958 18.041 -0.083
[-9.58]*** [-3.23]*** [-0.29]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.973 0.948 0.025 0.960 0.948 0.012 0.942 0.943 -0.001
[6.09]*** [2.13]** [-0.22]
Second residences 16.671 16.669 0.002 16.732 17.817 -1.085 16.615 17.108 -0.493
[0.00] [-1.61] [-0.62]
Vehicles pc. 0.524 0.496 0.028 0,512 0.498 0.014 0.492 0.492 0.000
[5.75]*** [2.19]** [0.04]
Property Tax rate 0.595 0.556 0.039 0.580 0.557 0.023 0.571 0.580 -0.009
[7.59]*** [3.38]*** [-1.10]
Property tax base pc. 16.126 15.866 0.2591 17.094 16.687 0.207 15.821 15.232 0.589
[5.35]*** [0.57] [0.86]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 393.961 364.692 24.269 380.359 367.171 13.188 356.620 353.654 2.966
[4.81]*** [1.89]* [0.41]
Total expenditure pc. 565.874 571.789 -5915 566.352 566.163 0.189 540.178 533.443 -0.604
[-0.75] [0.02] [-0.05]
Current revenues pc. 501.777 474.697 27.080 485.332 472.119 13.213 447.51 440.775 6.735
[3.64***] [1.28] [0.66]
Debt burden 0.081 0.072 0.009 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.076 0.073 0.003
[3.99]*** [2.48]** [0.97]
N. Observations 1,737 2,890 4,627 962 1,319 2,281 625 867 1,492
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.3 Regression Discontinuity
To compare similar municipalities where the govern type could be considered as a quasi-
random event, we first limit the full sample to a close elections sample. That is, a sample
containing only those municipalities which one seat determined if the winning party could
form a majority government or not. In other words, those municipalities whose winning
party obtained the half of the seats plus or minus one.
This procedure is similar to a RDD but not exactly it. To perform an appropriate
RDD we should compare municipalities where a few number of votes - instead of seats-
determined the final government typology. This methodology has been used in Curto-Grau
et al., 2015. If it was a viable option we would directly performed it but in our analysis it is
not. This procedure would need hypothesis on which party would receive the votes lost for
another one. This hypothesis would determine our comparison group adding a problem in
our identification strategy. For this reason we decide to use this similar approach based on
seats instead of votes.
In tables 2 and 3 one can observe that this procedure reduces di↵erences between treated
and control group although it does not eliminate them. The share left and right wing parties
sustaining power substantially change when considering treated (minorities land coalitions)
and control group (majorities). Tables 2A and 3A in the appendix show that there are more
coalitions and minorities on the left wing rather than right one. For example, the main right
party PP is the mayor only in the 19.53 % of coalition municipalities whereas the main left
wing one PSOE is the mayor in the 47,81%. Another problem of this procedure is that the
number of majorities with respect to minorities and coalitions in the close sample is also
di↵erent; 1,332 vs 925. Arte´s and Jurado, 2014 points that this is due to a mechanical e↵ect
of the rule d’Hondt used to distribute the seats. It favours the formation of majorities.
Briefly, this RDD procedure reduce di↵erences on political and control variables but does
not eliminate them. Therefore, our identification strategy will follow by performing a match
on political characteristics using the close election sample.
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4.4 Matching
In order to solve previous imbalance we perform an exact matching on political variables7.
The objective is to provide a balanced sample to compare the treated group (minorities and
coalitions) with the control group (majorities).
This exact match looks for similar municipalities within the same term, the same number
of seats, the same ruling political party, principal political party in the opposition block and
the same number of parties conforming the opposition block. It controls for the electoral term
because the sample considers two terms. It could be the case that, for example, corruption
possibilities appeared only in the second term favouring at the same time the presence
of coalition (more fragmentation) and corruption scandals. That would bias results. For
example; for a municipality of the treated group with 13 seats and minority government
where the PSOE rules and PP is the principal opposition party, the match will twin it with
a municipality with the exactly the same political variables but with a majority government
from the control group. Table 4a present some examples of matched municipalities.
Table 4a: Matched examples
Treaded Control
Minority - Majority IU PSOE — PP CC IU PSOE — PP CC
1 (4) — [5] 1 1 (3) — [6] 1
Minority - Majority PSOE ERC — CIU PP PSOE ERC — CIU PP
3 (5) — [8] 1 3 (4) — [9] 1
Coalition - Majority IU PSOE — PP IU PSOE — PP
2 [5] — (6) 1 [7] — (5)
Coalition - Majority PSOE ERC — CIU PSOE ERC — CIU
1 [4] — (4) 1 [5] — (3)
Notes: [#] identifies mayor’s party. (#) identifies principal opposition party
Using this match on political characteristics we ensure a perfect balance on political
characteristics and moreover, we achieve balance on the control characteristics that could
influence either corruption possibilities or government type. Table 2 on political charac-
7This analysis uses a Stata implementation of coarsened exact matching (CEM). A new method for im-
proving the estimation of causal e↵ects by reducing imbalance between treated and control groups. Blackwell,
2010
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teristics shows the mean for the treated, the control group and their di↵erences. We can
observe that after the match those di↵erences disappear being reduced to zero. They are not
statistically significant meaning that groups are balanced. Table 3 on control characteristics
shows that after the matching on political characteristics we also obtain balanced treated
and control group on demographic, economic and budget variables. Remember that these
variables could play a role on determining both corruption opportunities and government
type. For example, contrary to the unmatched sample, now population growth and debt
burden do not present statistically significant di↵erences.
This complete balance is the positive aspect of this match but it brings two majors
trades o↵. First one is the lost of observations. In table 5 we can observe that we lose 1/3 of
the observations; from 2,281 to 1,492. But, the most important lost of observations comes
from the RDD. When considering only close elections more than 1/2 of the observations are
lost. Moreover, matching procedure leads to an inevitable lost observations due to ensure
the common support (Keele, 2012). We lose observations because it is di cult to obtain
a twin for some regional, local or minority parties that did not obtain representation in
relevant number of municipalities. This is a mechanic e↵ect since we cannot find possible
comparisons. Table 4b present some examples of unmatched municipalities.
Table 4b:Unmatched examples
Treaded Control
Majority PSOE UPI-F — UPN
1 (4) — [6]
Minority ERC PAM — CIU PP
2 (3) — [6] 2
Coalition PSOE — CC PP
(4) — [3] 2
Notes: [#] identifies mayor’s party. (#) identifies principal opposition party
Second problem of this empirical strategy is the external valid of the results. However,
the lost of external validity comes from the RDD. As in any RDD the external validity
is limited. When comparing only close elections we compare municipalities with similar
political competition. Leaving aside other municipalities with large majorities or extremely
fragmented city councils. Other comparisons would not be valid. We will be analysing the
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e↵ect of electoral margin and not comparing coalitions versus majorities.
Table 5: Corruption scandals 1999-2007
Unmatched Matched close elections
Corruption scandals Full Sample Close elections Parties ideology Exact party
1999-2003 250 105 92 69
2003-2007 352 169 139 107
Total 602 274 231 176
Observations 4,627 2,281 2,027 1,492
Thus, after the match we lose 1/3 of total observations. Is this a problem? Table 5 presents
the number of corruption cases and observations in each of the steps of our empirical strategy. We
argue that the match does not a↵ect the reliability of the corruption sample because both, the lost
of observations and corruption cases, represents 1/3 of the observations.
As explained before, this strict match based on exactly the same term, number of seats, mayor
party, principal party of the opposition block and number of parties conforming the opposition
block generates the reduction of the sample under analysis. In order to prove that this strict match
is needed, we present an alternative matching. It relax the condition referring to the same political
parties by same ideology. Therefore, this alternative match would twin similar municipalities in the
same term with the same number of seats, the same ideology for the mayor and principal opposition
party and the same number of parties conforming the opposition block. For example, this match
would twin a nine-seats city council of the second term with a right wing party ruling in majority
and one from the left wing on the opposition and two parties on the opposition block with a similar
municipality presenting the only di↵erence of governing under a minority or coalition government.
Tables 4A and 5A display the means and di↵erences on political and control characteristics. We
can observes how the main strength is that a larger number of observations are maintained but, it
fails to provide balanced treated and control groups.
We have showed how, after the match we obtained balanced treated and control group. Next
tables 6, 7 and 8 present the results for the two following subsamples; minorities vs majorities and
coalitions vs majorities. When considering these two subsamples the balance between treated and
control group remain. Therefore, we obtain the three di↵erent samples used in our analysis. First
one, considers minorities and coalitions and compares them to majorities. Second, will compare
minorities versus majorities and third one coalitions versus majorities. This approach allows us to
answer whether coalition governments are truly bad news for corruption. Moreover, we will be able
to analyse this possible e↵ect for minorities and for coalitions and minorities together.
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Table 6: Political characteristics. Close elections
Minorities (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Total number of seats 13.540 12.783 0.757 13.305 13.307 -0.002
[4.09]*** [-0.01]
Mayor ideology 0.380 0.477 -0.097 0.372 0.372 0.000
[-3.97]*** [-0.00]
Oposition ideology 0.787 0.437 0.350 0.482 0.482 -0.000
[1.36] [-0.00]
Number parties opposition block 2.005 1.598 0.407 1.845 1.845 -0.000
[10.40]*** [-0.00]
N. Observations 628 1,332 1,960 426 867 1,293
Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Total number of seats 13.120 12.783 0.337 13.124 13.133 -0.009
[1.31] [-0.04]
Mayor ideology 0.268 0.477 -0.209 0.272 0.272 0.000
[-7.02]*** [0.00]
Oposition ideology 0.733 0.437 0.296 0.726 0.726 -0.000
[9.88]*** [-0.00]
Number parties opposition block 1.629 1.598 0.031 1.583 1.583 0.000
[0.72] [0.00]
N. Observations 297 1,332 1,629 209 681 890
Notes: (1) [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) Mayor and opposition ideology gives value 0=left and 1=right
Table 7: Control characteristics. Close elections.
Minorities (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 11.187 10.766 0.421 10.555 10.172 0.383
[0.35] [0.31]
Population growth 2.338 1.038 1.300 2.026 1.520 0.506
[3.17]** [0.96]
Education level 35.330 34.214 1.116 35.215 34.624 0.591
[2.75]** [1.18]
Population under 16years 16.739 16.727 0.012 16.789 16.985 -0.196
[0.09] [-1.07]
Population over 65years 17.342 18.353 -1.011 17.741 17.852 -0.111
[-3.99] [-0.35]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.959 0.949 0.010 0.948 0.942 0.006
[2.38]** [0.74]
Second residences 16.207 17.725 -1.518 16.513 16.143 0.370
[-2.00]** [0.42]
Vehicles pc. 0.519 0.500 0.019 0.499 0.492 0.007
[2.37]** [0.92]
Property Tax rate 0.590 0.558 0.032 0.581 0.580 0.001
[4.11]*** [0.20]
Property tax base pc. 17.708 16.721 0.987 16.160 15.396 0.763
[1.18] [0.95]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 385.316 367.447 17.869 361.537 359.804 1.733
[2.23]** [0.21]
Total expenditure pc. 568.473 566.326 2.147 537.297 547.130 -0.933
[0.17] [-0.69]
Current revenues pc. 492.920 472.382 20.538 455.571 452.317 3.254
[1.74]* [0.26]
Debt burden 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.078 0.077 0.001
[2.18]* [0.35]
N. Observations 628 1,332 1,960 426 867 1,293
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Control characteristics. Close elections.
Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 11.692 10.766 0.926 11.436 11.536 -100
[0.48] [-0.05]
Population growth 0.848 1.038 -0.190 0.881 0.248 0.633
[-0.27] [0.85]
Education level 35.296 34.214 1.082 35,496 34.779 0.717
[1.95]* [1.04]
Population under 16years 16.596 16.727 -0.131 16.596 16.727 -0.131
[-0.68] [-0.68]
Population over 65years 18.147 18.352 -0.205 18.264 18.580 -0.316
[-0.61] [-0.74]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.947 0.949 -0.002 0.944 0.957 -0.013
[-0.33] [-1.26]
Second residences 17.691 17.728 -0.037 17.548 16.424 1.124
[-0.04] [0.93]
Vehicles pc. 0.498 0.500 -0.002 0.489 0.494 -0.005
[-0.26] [-0.52]
Property Tax rate 0.568 0.558 0.010 0.556 0.573 -0.017
[0.99] [-1.42]
Property tax base pc. 16.271 16.721 -0.449 16.038 14.840 1.197
[-0.51] [1.27]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 367.786 367.447 0.339 351.755 349.798 1.957
[0.04] [0.18]
Total expenditure pc. 487.494 506.326 -18.832 526.670 526.737 -0.067
[-1.26] [-0.00]
Current revenues pc. 462.963 472.384 -9.421 441.594 434.391 7.203
[-0.69] [0.49]
Debt burden 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.079 0.071 0.008
[1.21] [1.55]
N. Observations 297 1,332 1,629 209 681 890
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, we must accept that our results may be mostly valid for major parties. Because mu-
nicipalities presenting local or regional parties are more likely to be unmatched. However, this
does not suppose an important caveat. Those majors parties represent the vast majority of cases.
Tables 2A and 3A in the appendix demonstrate that when considering the full sample, those major




Table 9 present the results for the three samples previously described: First, considering as
treated group minorities and coalitions together, second minorities and third coalitions. All of
them compared to majorities. The table presents the coe cient value and standard error for
the treated group in an OLS regression with corruption as the dependent variable. Column (1)
corresponds to the regression with only the constant and the dummy for treated group shown in
identification strategy section. Column (2) adds a time fix e↵ect; our sample contain observations
belonging to two periods 1999-2003 and 2003-2007 so this time fix e↵ect wants to account for
possible di↵erences appearing between those two terms. The match performed already considered
this element, therefore, results should not change. Columns (3) controls for the political variables
used to perform the match. In this situation, similar to the time fixed e↵ects, the match also
considered these political characteristics. Thus, results might not change substantially. Finally
column (4) presents the same regression of column (3) for those observations for which we have full
information on control characteristics. Finally, column (5) controls for demographic, economic and
budget characteristics that before de match presented statistically significant di↵erences between
the treated and control group. Note that regressions (4) and (5) uses a lower number of observations
comparing to (1), (2) and (3). This happens because the dataset does not contain information on
control characteristics for all of the observations.
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Table 9: Main Results.
Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minorities + -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006
Coalitions (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 1,492 1,492 1,492 1,046 1,046
Minorities (T) vs Majorities (C)
Minorities -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.025 -0.022
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 1,293 1,293 1,293 991 991
Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Coalitions 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 889 889 889 883 883
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results point that the answer to our question whether coalitions are more corrupt compared
to majorities is no. And not only this, the three approaches show no statistically significant
coe cients associated to treated group. That is, there are not di↵erences on the propensity to
corruption between coalitions, minorities and majorities. Observe that these results are maintained
when controls are added to the regression and also when the number of observations is reduced on
regressions (4) and (5).
5.2 Robustness analysis
Alternative matching
In section 4.4 we have explained a less strict alternative match base on parties0 ideologies. Next
table 10 present the same regressions displayed in previous table 9 for this alternative match.
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Table 10: Results alternative match.
Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Minorities + 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.006
Coalitions (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 2,027 2,027 2,027 1,300 1,300
Minorities (T) vs Majorities (C)
Minorities -0.002 -0.002 -0.011 -0.012 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 1,687 1,687 1,687 1,162 1,162
Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Coalitions 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.020 0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
N. Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,091 1,091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Again, results point that there are not di↵erences on the propensity to corruption between
coalitions, minorities and majorities. These findings support previous results. These results are
maintained even when controls are added to the regression and also when the number of observa-
tions is reduced on regressions (4) and (5).
Other corruption measures
What if the publishing probability of a corruption case is higher in coalition governments rather
than majority ones? There is an important range of possibilities why some government typologies
could be more watched increasing the probability of being caught if corruption happens. For
example, one may argue that press coverage could be grater in coalition governments. More parties
involved could mean higher interest for newspaper readers. Or maybe, since most of coalition
governments belong to the left wing block, right wing oriented press will be more interested in
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finding those possible misbehaviours.
Table 11: Extended Results.
Cases published in the term Cases published after the term
Minorities Minorities Coalitions Minorities Minorities Coalitions
+ Coalitions + Coalitions
Treated -0.006 -0.002 0.025 -0.014 -0.003 0.017
(0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Political variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,009 970 867 922 919 831
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11 above display the results of the regression (5) for the three samples. In this case the
table is divined in two parts: cases published in the same term and those published after the term.
The samples are formed dropping in each case the municipalities presenting the opposite situation:
For the sample of cases published in the same term we drop those municipalities presenting cases
published after the term and vice versa. Even though we do not check the balance between treated
and control group after this procedure, we consider that it will remain. Therefore, results on table
11 support previous results finding no statistically significant di↵erences for any of the treated
groups considered. Neither using the sample of corruption cases published within the term nor
considering the sample of corruption cases published after the term.
The procedure used in table 11 to define the samples is not the optimal one. In order to preserve
all previous guarantees we should separate the municipalities before the match and complete the full
identification strategy for both samples. Another possibility would be: to drop the municipalities
belonging to the other category together with its twins after the match. Checking again the balance
on control characteristics.
Finally, we argue that the possible bias on published cases between coalitions and majorities
can also be identified if the probability of a corruption case to be published in the same period
is di↵erent between govern types. Using only municipalities of the matched sample presenting a
corruption case we run regressions where the dependent variable is being a municipality where
the corruption case is published within the same term. The meaning of Treated coe cient is the
following: If it is significant it means that the probability of a corruption case to be published in




Dependent variable: Corruption case published in the same period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coalitions + Minorities 0.087 0.087 0.080 0.083 0.078
(0.061) (0.062) (0.067) (0.072) (0.079)
Time FE NO YES YES YES YES
Political variables NO NO YES YES YES
Control Variables NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 176 176 176 161 161
Published same period 134 134 134 124 124
Published after the period 42 42 42 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12 shows that this possible endogeneity in published cases does not exist. The coe cient
expresses possible di↵erences between treated and control group Treated is not statistically signifi-
cant in any of the regressions. Even when accounting for time e↵ects or controlling for political and
control variables. Hence, the probability of a corruption scandal being publish in the same period
is not di↵erent between government types. We can conclude that the identification strategy works
in constructing balanced samples obtaining not biased results when answering whether coalition
governments mean bad news for corruption.
6 Conclusions
This paper empirically studies whether corruption is caused by the type of government using
data of Spanish municipalities for the period 1999-2007 the type of government. The empirical
analysis compares municipalities that are nearly identical regarding their political characteristics,
with the only di↵erence on government type; coalition or majority. The results show that there is
no causal e↵ect of the government type on the existence of corruption scandals. Coalitions are not
more (or less) corrupt than majorities. The same result holds for minority governments. However,
this conclusion is only valid for those municipalities were elections are close, a condition imposed
to select our sample in order to have comparable municipalities. .
We also show that the timing of publication of the scandal is not related to the government
type. Coalition (and neither minority) governments do not present higher publishing probabilities
when presenting corrupt misbehaviors.
In order to provide external validity to our results, we would need to study the e↵ect of the
government type allowing for di↵erent electoral margins. If we consider electoral margin we could
25
find di↵erent e↵ect on corruption between coalitions and majorities. But, we could also find di↵er-
ences within majorities. A paradigmatic example of a large majority presenting corruption scandal
is the city of Marbella; with the local party GIL obtaining large majorities from 1991 to 2003.
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7 Appendix
Table 1A: Summary statistics
Description Mean sd Source
Political variables
Total number of seats N. of seats to be elected in the city council 13 3.858 Electoral results database; Spanish Inte-
rior Ministry
Mayor ideology It takes value of 0 if mayor party belongs
to the left wing and 1 if belong to the right
wing one
0.420 0.494 Created from: Electoral results database;
Spanish Interior Ministry
Opposition ideology It takes value of 0 if main opposition party
belongs to the left wing and 1 if belong to
the right wing one
0.486 0.500 Created from Electoral results database;
Spanish Interior Ministry
N. parties opposition block N. of parties with representation in the
council belonging to a mayor0 di↵erent ide-
ology
1.713 0.788 Created from: Electoral results database;
Spanish Interior Ministry
Demographic variables
Population Population in thousands for each munici-
pality
10.365 0.969 Local census; Spanish National Statistic
Institute (INE)
Population growth Share of population growth between 1995
and 1999
1.404 8.930 Local census; Spanish National Statistic
Institute (INE)
Education level Share of population with post-compulsory
education
34.71 8.661 The census of population and houses;
Spanish National Statistic Institute (INE)
Population under 16years Share of population under 16 years old 16.69 3.043 The census of population and houses;
Spanish National Statistic Institute (INE)
Population over 65years Share of population over 65 years old 18.09 5.392 The census of population and houses;
Spanish National Statistic Institute (INE)
Economic variables
Income pc. Combines information on occupancy, ac-
tivity and professional situation.
0.954 0.139 The census of population and houses 2001;
Spanish National Statistic Institute (INE)
Second residences Share of second residences over the total 17.36 16.00 The census of population and houses 2001;
Spanish National Statistic Institute (INE)
Vehicles pc. N. of motorized vehicles per capita 0.505 0.158 Spanish Economic Yearbook 1999; La
Caixa
Property tax rate Municipality tax rate applied to property
tax bases
0.567 0.158 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
Property tax base pc. Value of property tax base per capita, in
thousands
16.86 17.03 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. Chapters 1 to 5 of the local expenditures
budget
372.8 152.0 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
Total expenditure pc. Chapters 1 to 7 of the local expenditures
budget
566.2 247.2 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
Current revenues pc. Chapters 1 to 5 of the local revenues bud-
get
477.8 229.4 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
Debt burden Chapters 3 and 9 of local expenditures
over chapters 1 to 5 of local revenues bud-
get
0.074 0.070 Spanish Ministry of Treasury
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Table 2A: Mayor and opposition parties frequencies. Full Sample
Mayor parties
Full Sample Close elections Match
Party Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
PSOE 44.59 42.83 47.52 44.33 59.25 59.25
PP 19.01 35.96 19.86 35.33 24.83 24.83
CIU 6.12 6.02 5.98 5.92 4.79 4.79
IU 5.67 2.33 5.53 2.43 4.97 4.97
CC 1.03 1.70 1.13 0.97 0.17 0.17
PA 2.26 0.74 2.03 0.89 1.37 1.37
ERC 2.84 0.67 2.48 0.49 1.03 1.03
Opposition parties
Unmatched Close elections Match
Party Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
PSOE 24.47 40.43 24.09 41.59 32.25 32.25
PP 48.64 33.72 53.09 35.03 52.73 52.73
CIU 9.87 3.73 7.69 3.44 3.24 3.24
IU 0.66 4.99 0.38 5.00 5.63 5.63
CC 0.66 1.11 0.63 0.55 0.17 0.17
PA 0.007 1.69 0.86 1.41 1.19 1.19
ERC 1.33 2.30 2.02 2.27 1.54 1.54
Parties frequencies (% over total observations)
Table 3A: Mayor and opposition parties frequencies. Close elections.
Mayor parties
Minorities vs Majorities Coalitions vs Majorities
Unmatched Match Unmatched Match
Party Minorities Majorities Minorities Majorities Coalitions Majorities Coalitions Majorities
PSOE 48.73 44.14 54.69 54.69 47.81 44.14 61.72 61.72
PP 21.66 34.61 25.82 25.82 19.53 34.61 33.04 24.40
CIU 8,12 6.76 7.75 7.75 3.03 6.76 2.79 2.87
IU 5.25 2.33 4.93 4.93 7.41 2.33 4.31 4.31
CC 1.11 0.90 0.23 0.90 0.23 1.68 - -
PA 1.01 0.83 1.17 1.17 2.36 0.83 1.91 1.91
ERC 1.91 0.53 1.17 1.17 5.05 0.53 4.31 4.31
Opposition parties
Minorities vs Majorities Coalitions vs Majorities
Unmatched Match Unmatched Match
Party Minorities Majorities Minorities Majorities Coalitions Majorities Coalitions Majorities
PSOE 32.80 40.17 36.85 36.85 22.22 40.17 25.84 25.84
PP 31.21 33.86 41.55 41.25 56.90 33.86 55.77 55.77
CIU 7.01 3.68 3.52 3.52 11.45 3.68 11.00 11.00
IU 6.69 4.80 7.98 7.98 1.01 4.80 0.28 0.28
CC 0.32 0.53 0.12 0.12 1.01 0.53 0.48 0.48
PA 1.75 1.35 1.64 1.64 0.31 1.35 0.13 0.13
ERC 2.87 2.18 2.11 2.11 1.01 2.18 1.44 1.44
Parties frequencies (% over total observations)
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Table 4A: Political characteristics: Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C). Match (2) parties ideology
Unmatched Matched
Full Sample Close elections Close elections
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest] [ttest]
Total number of seats 14.498 13.204 1.294 13.288 12.789 0.499 13.185 13.179 0.006
[9.71]** [3.07]** [0.04]
Mayor ideology 0.341 0.500 -0.159 0.338 0.477 -0.139 0.332 0.332 0.000
[-9.83]** [-6.26]** [0.00]
Opposition ideology 0.423 0.686 -0.263 0.434 0.563 -0.129 0,564 0.564 0.000
[15.91]** [5.64]** [0.00]
N. parties opposition 2.154 1.519 0.632 1.892 1.582 0.310 1.806 1.806 0.000
[22.86]** [9.08]** [0.00]
N. Observations 1,735 2,892 4,627 962 1,319 2,281 1,176 851 2,027
Notes: (1) [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) Mayor and opposition ideology gives value 0=left and 1=right
Table 5A: Control characteristics: Minorities + Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C). Match (2) parties ideology
Unmatched Matched
Full Sample Close elections Close elections
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 15.940 12.233 3.707 10.931 10.819 0.112 10.368 10.034 0.284
[3.85]*** [0.10] [0.29]
Population growth 2.125 0.984 1.1141 1.907 1.017 0.890 1.748 1.529 0.219
[3.65]*** [2.23]** [0.54]
Education level 36.221 34.365 1.856 35.377 34.225 1.152 35.249 34.739 0.510
[7.01]*** [3.18]*** [1.36]
Population under 16years 16.711 16.572 0.139 16.648 16.728 -0.080 16.663 16.777 -0.114
[1.45] [-0.63] [-0.84]
Population over 65years 16.910 18.501 -1.591 17.666 18.393 -0.727 17.809 18.095 -0.286
[-9.58]*** [-3.23]*** [1.16]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.973 0.948 0.025 0.960 0.948 0.012 0.954 0.947 0.007
[6.09]*** [2.13]** [1.28]
Second residences 16.671 16.669 0.002 16.732 17.817 -1.085 16.554 16.948 -0.394
[0.00] [-1.61] [-057]
Vehicles pc. 0.524 0.496 0.028 0,512 0.498 0.014 0.506 0.501 0.005
[5.75]*** [2.19]** [0.74]
Property Tax rate 0.595 0.556 0.039 0.580 0.557 0.023 0.580 0.567 0.013
[7.59]*** [3.38]*** [1.79]*
Property tax base pc. 16.126 15.866 0.2591 17.094 16.687 0.207 16.650 15.904 0.746
[5.35]*** [0.57] [1.07]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 393.961 364.692 24.269 380.359 367.171 13.188 374.736 362.188 12.548
[4.81]*** [1.89]* [1.80]*
Total expenditure pc. 565.874 571.789 -5915 566.352 566.163 0.189 558.232 544.858 13.374
[-0.75] [0.02] [1.18]
Current revenues pc. 501.777 474.697 27.080 485.332 472.119 13.213 475.238 470.667 4.571
[3.64***] [1.28] [0.41]
Debt burden 0.081 0.072 0.009 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.076 0.071 0.006
[3.99]*** [2.48]** [1.84]**
N. Observations 1,737 2,890 4,627 962 1,319 2,281 851 1,176 2,027
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.131
Table 6A: Control characteristics. Close elections. Match (2) parties ideology
Minorities (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 11.187 10.766 0.421 10.182 9.768 0.414
[0.35] [0.43]
Population growth 2.338 1.038 1.300 2.171 1.811 0.360
[3.17]** [0.84]
Education level 35.330 34.214 1.116 35.262 34.928 0.334
[2.75]** [0.78]
Population under 16years 16.739 16.727 0.012 16,753 16.869 -0.116
[0.09] [-0.74]
Population over 65years 17.342 18.353 -1.011 17.521 17.883 -0.362
[-3.99] [-1.30]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.959 0.949 0.010 0.460 0.444 0.016
[2.38]** [2.33]**
Second residences 16.207 17.725 -1.518 16.374 16.412 -0.038
[-2.00]** [-005]
Vehicles pc. 0.519 0.500 0.019 0.509 0.497 0.012
[2.37]** [1.58]
Property Tax rate 0.590 0.558 0.032 0.591 0.564 0.027
[4.11]*** [3.16]**
Property tac base pc. 17.708 16.721 0.987 17.338 15.995 1.343
[1.18] [1.50]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 385.316 367.447 17.869 380.29 360.203 20.006
[2.23]** [2.50]**
Total expenditure pc. 568.473 566.326 2.147 562.473 546.866 15.607
[0.17] [1.19]
Current revenues pc. 492.920 472.382 20.538 482.866 462.495 20.371
[1.74]* [1.62]
Debt burden 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.077 0.074 0.003
[2.18]* [1.01]
N. Observations 628 1,332 1,960 570 1,117 1,697
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7A: Control characteristics. Close elections. Match (2) parties ideology
Coalitions (T) vs Majorities (C)
Unmatched Matched
Mean T Mean C di↵ Mean T Mean C di↵
[ttest] [ttest]
Demographic variables
Population 11.692 10.766 0.926 11.053 10.681 0.372
[0.48] [0.21]
Population growth 0.848 1.038 -0.190 1.052 0.648 0.404
[-0.27] [0.59]
Education level 35.296 34.214 1.082 35.274 34.381 0.893
[1.95]* [1.53]
Population under 16years 16.596 16.727 -0.131 16.548 16.717 -0.169
[-0.68] [-0.82]
Population over 65years 18.147 18.352 -0.205 16.225 16.600 -0.375
[-0.61] [-1.00]
Economic variables
Income pc. 0.947 0.949 -0.002 0.948 0.945 0.003
[-0.33] [0.43]
Second residences 17.691 17.728 -0.037 17.866 17.227 0.639
[-0.04] [0.61]
Vehicles pc. 0.498 0.500 -0.002 0.498 0.495 0.003
[-0.26] [0.36]
Property Tax rate 0.568 0.558 0.010 0.568 0.571 -0.003
[0.99] [-0.30]
Property tac base pc. 16.271 16.721 -0.449 16.354 15.406 0.948
[-0.51] [1.09]
Budget variables
Current expenditure pc. 367.786 367.447 0.339 367.548 359.210 8.338
[0.04] [0.82]
Total expenditure pc. 487.494 506.326 -18.832 548.856 534.875 13.981
[-1.26] [0.86]
Current revenues pc. 462.963 472.384 -9.421 463.667 446.939 16.728
[-0.69] [1.22]
Debt burden 0.076 0.070 0.006 0.076 0.067 0.009
[1.21] [1.94]*
N. Observations 297 1,332 1,629 286 887 1,173
Note: [t-statistic in brackets] ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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